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Abstract 
In recent years, increasing focus has been made on making good business decisions utilizing the 
product of data analysis. With the advent of the Big Data phenomenon, this is even more apparent 
than ever before. But the question is how can organizations trust decisions made on the basis of 
results obtained from analysis of untrusted data? Assurances and trust that data and datasets that 
inform these decisions have not been tainted by outside agency.  
This study will propose enabling the authentication of datasets specifically by the extension of the 
RESTful architectural scheme to include authentication parameters while operating within a larger 
holistic security framework architecture or model compliant to legislation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In today’s business environment the use of information technologies to augment traditional business 
intelligence in order to gain a competitive advantage is an increasing focus. One of the more current 
applications of information technology is the use of data gathered from clients or customers in 
analytical activities in order to predict trends and/or monitor consumer behaviour. Collection of this 
big data is a big challenge, pun intended, just because of the sheer amount of data generated by users. 
Predictions of the amount of data that will have passed through the internet by the year 2020 is about 
35 zettabytes, or 35 x 1021 bytes or 35 billion terabytes and the rate of increase will grow even higher 
as the years pass. Coupled with this, the emergence of the Big Data phenomenon is attracting a large 
amount of attention and placing a higher imperative for Big Data analytics and storage. The 
International Data Corporation (IDC, 2013) now projects that the market for Big Data will increase 
through to $32.4 billion in the year 2017. 
With the increased market for Big Data, as well as the potential long term effects that Big Data will 
have on decision making and enterprise resource planning, this brings to mind the importance of 
safeguarding this data. Protecting the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy of customer 
data and of data storage and transmission will become even more critical as the impact of a security 
breach can be severe. 
This paper provides a brief look into what Big Data is, illustrating need for further research into Big 
Data security and proposes a study on a modular, holistic security architecture for Big Data based on 
an extended Open and Trusted Health Information System framework developed at QUT. 
This study will exclude organization data collection activities, as this is not within the scope of 
security. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 What is Big Data? 
The first traceable recorded use of the term “Big Data” in the modern context was by John Mashey 
(1997) in various talks circa 1997-1998 while he was at Silicon Graphics. This is then followed by 
Weiss and Indurkhya (1998) who refer to Big Data in a data-mining context and suggest practical 
difficulties for its application. 
A research note by Laney (2001) defined what would be the now ubiquitous three V’s of Big Data. 
Volume, Velocity and Veracity. This is THE first definition of the characteristics of Big Data and 
Gartner’s definition of Big Data mentions these V’s exclusively. From here, the Big Data phenomenon 
begins to pick up speed with more and more organizations adopting, co-opting and expanding on 
Laney’s concepts (Laney, 2012) and over the years, many attempts to append or expand this definition 
to include characteristics such as Variability, Value, Veracity, and Volatility, among others 
(Wired.com, 2013; InformationWeek, 2013) can be found. 
Kusnetzky (2010) refers to Big Data in the context of a discipline which states that “Big Data” is the 
specific tools, processes and procedures allowing an organization to create, manipulate and manage 
very large data sets.  
From this one can see the evolution of the Big Data phenomenon, from a vague concept, to something 
more defined, and now to something approaching a discipline which organizations are currently 
adopting.  
The profusion of definitions and the ongoing debate over what constitutes Big Data indicates the 
relative complexity of the subject matter and the need for the concept to mature further. For the 
purposes of this study, Big Data will be defined as ‘Data and Data Collections of ever increasing 
Volume, Velocity, Variety,  and Complexity, that are used by organizations to operate effectively, 
make accurate decisions, reduce risks while providing reliable service to customers’. However, as this 
study does not delve into Big Data directly, this definition will serve to inform the requirements for 
this Data’s security. 
Some parties have identified the privacy concerns which may arise from the potential use of Big Data 
[16], and a number of research organizations have embarked on security research for Big Data 
Architecture, but these remain relatively few in number. Some of the related security work will be 
explored in Section 4. 
2.2 An Issue of Trust 
Big Data is being used across the broad spectrum of fields and industries, from governance to retail, 
science to security. Some high profile applications of Big Data include: Retail (Mercier et al., 2013), 
Genomics (Winney et al, 2012; Donelly, 2014), Governance (Archer, 2013; Joseph and Johnson, 
2013; Kim, 2014), Geospatial data (Hemsley, 2013), Health (McGregor, 2013; Celi et al, 2013; 
Schouten, 2013), Fraud Prevention (Hipgrave, 2013), and Cyber Security (Ponemon, 2013). With this 
wide scale adoption of the Big Data paradigm comes an awareness of the privacy concerns of using 
data from certain sources.  
Without sufficient thought to keep this data secure across the board, there is a potential for future 
improper use of this data in future. It may be extremely improbable that this occurs, but with advances 
in future technologies and analytics capabilities happening at a fast rate, data holds insight and value 
which was hitherto undiscovered. 
With even cyber security utilizing Big Data analytics in a bigger way now than in the past, it may be 
prudent to consider certain trust issues. Because as it is big data, the feasibility to manually examine 
each and every data output for its veracity is contraindicated. 
Trust has to be in the collections of data (datasets) and the processes used to analyse them. In large 
corporations, large datasets are being transferred around the globe. The transferal process, which 
includes details about its transmission and receipt, is part of this trust. The transfer itself needs to be 
accurate, authenticated and correct. 
How can organizations trust conclusions/decisions made on the basis of results obtained from analysis 
of untrusted data? The short answer is: they can’t. Water drawn from a poisoned well will prove 
inevitably to be poisoned as well. Garbage in, garbage out. Therefore, assurances and trust that the 
data and datasets that information is being generated from is not tainted are needed. 
2.3 Consequences of a data breach: a justification for improved security 
Continued evolution of security is important because, as the utility, nature, and complexity of these 
systems are constantly changing and increasing, the number of people looking to exploit these types of 
systems is also increasing. Individuals or parties with malicious intent are constantly on the lookout 
for new ways to compromise these systems. No rest for the wicked, as it were. 
Furthermore, as businesses and the processes in which BI is generated (including BDA) evolve 
towards a cloud-based model (Liu, 2013; Talia, 2013), security is more often than not, playing catch-
up with hackers. With this, it is even more necessary for security technologies to develop to a 
sufficient maturity to be able to handle or at least mitigate even new unforeseen threats.  
The most direct obvious consequence or impact of insufficient capability to meet this threat is 
financial loss, whether through the cost of investigation or legal penalties paid as a direct result of data 
breaches, even if no data was actually stolen in the attack. Another effect of a data breach is the loss of 
customer confidence. 
In December 2013, Target (Target, 2013) announced that personal information and credit card details 
of up to 70 million individuals had been compromised. Soon after, Neiman Marcus (CSO, 2014) as 
well as several other US retailers came forward to announce that they too had experienced a data 
breach. The following table is an estimate of the cost of the data breach: 
 
Company Data Severity Potential Cost* Method of Breach 
Neiman 
Marcus 
July - Dec 2013 
(CNBC, 2014) 
350,000 payment cards exposed 
(Neiman Marcus Group, 2014) 
Estimated to be 
$27,300,000  
Hack, malware on 
POS registers 
Target Dec 2013 Est. 70 million individuals 
affected (Target 2014) 
Estimated to be 
$5,460,000,000 
Hack, malware on 
POS registers 
Table 1.  Estimated cost of a data breach (Estimated costs were calculated based on a 
Ponemon Institute study on the Costs of a Data Breach (2013) which comes to an 
average of US$78 per record for the Retail industry) 
These incidents may or may not be directly related to Big Data Analytics and/or Business Intelligence 
itself, however, if the pattern of these attacks is mirrored at a later date in a Big Data environment, the 
effect of such a breach would be even greater in the long term, as many critical decisions are made on 
the basis of results obtained during analytics activities. 
2.4 Related Work 
Although not many academic papers which refer to or propose an architecture for Big Data, there are 
several data centre and cloud computing related architectural papers which may be of relevance.  
Several general works describing the conception of Big Data architecture are: the NIST Cloud 
Computing Reference Architecture, (NIST, 2011), IBM Business Analytics and Optimization 
Reference Architecture (IBM, 2011), Big Data Ecosystem Reference Architecture (Microsoft, 2011), 
and Understanding System and Architecture for Big Data (IBM, 2012). 
Oracle published its own Information Management and Big Data: A Reference Architecture (Oracle, 
2013) in February 2013. 
In September 2013, a draft paper which proposed a Big Data Architecture Framework (Demchenko et 
al., 2013) was made available online by researchers at the Universiteit van Amsterdam. This 
framework developed with and as part of the NIST Big Data Working Group addresses all aspects of 
Big Data which includes the aspect of Big Data security most relevant to the proposed study.  
The security portion of the framework proposed by Demchenko et al. deals specifically with the new 
paradigm of data-centric security. They suggest a Federated Access and Delivery Infrastructure 
(FADI) which include components that support inter-cloud Cloud Service Brokers, Trust Brokers, and 
Federated Identity Provider services.  
They also define Data Centric Access Control Policies which use the attribute-based policy language 
XACML which allows the description of rules for multi-domain resources which is used in 
conjunction with NoSQL databases. The paper mandates the use of encryption to enforce its access 
control and the use of a Trusted Infrastructure Bootstrapping Protocol which has its basis the Trusted 
Computing Group’s Reference architecture and Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Demchenko et al.’s 
paper however, does not discuss application security as one of the components of its security 
framework. 
Zhao et al. (2014) proposes a security framework in G-Hadoop for Big Data Computing across 
distributed Cloud data centres. Their framework uses a master-slave paradigm which allows slave 
nodes to process information without being aware of user information and also a single-sign-on 
process. 
Access control is provided by restricting user access to an SSL connection. The authentication concept 
of the G-Hadoop security framework proposed here by Zhao et al. follows the same concepts ascribed 
to by the Globus Security Infrastructure, which is a standard for Grid security. Zhao et al.’s framework 
utilizes various code, signature, and cryptographic based methods to secure the G-Hadoop application 
from man-in-the-middle, replay and delay attacks.  
However, if the G-Hadoop implementation does not run on a trusted platform it will not assure 
platform integrity and security and still leave the system vulnerable to attacks that exploits 
vulnerabilities in the platform.  
One more body of related work is the Open Security Architectures (OSA) listed at 
www.opensecurityarchitecture.org. The Open Security Architecture is an open source security 
framework developed and owned by the community in accordance with Creative Commons Share-
alike. Organizations and developers may pick and choose among control catalogues, visual patterns 
and assessment methods to tailor-make a security architecture specific to needs. 
However, as the OSA is technology agnostic, organizations may have to look further than the OSA to 
choose appropriate technologies (Christen, 2009) to enable security frameworks. This could result in 
organizations making less than optimal choices due to a lack of information or experience with the 
relevant technologies. 
2.5 Understanding the legal requirements of Big Data Security 
It is important in the socio-political context for applications and architectures for system security to be 
compliant to existing as well as upcoming legislation, especially in an area as controversial as the 
collection and analysis of what could very well be personally identifiable information.  
As of this paper’s writing, Australia is in the process of implementing the new Privacy Amendment 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, which establishes the 13 Australian Privacy Principles 
(APP) and applies to all organisations and Australian Government (and Norfolk Island Government) 
agencies from 12 March 2014 onwards. 
The United States Government has numerous federal and state legislation which have provisions for 
data privacy. Among them are, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Privacy Protection Act of 1978 (PPA), the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), the Children’s Internet Protection Act of 
2001 (CIPA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), and the Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA). 
The European Union has issued the European Union Data Protection Directive of 1998 and ratified the 
EU Internet Privacy Law of 2002 (Directive 2002/58/EC) with the express intention of protecting 
privacy of data. In Switzerland, the protection of Data is governed by the Federal Act on Data 
Protection (FADP). The United Kingdom has put into force the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) in the 
year 2000. 
Meanwhile in Asia, Singapore has the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (PDPA) which will come 
into force on 2 July 2014 and Taiwan passed their Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA) which 
came into force in October 2012. In Malaysia, their own Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA) 
took effect in November 2013. 
It is interesting to note that there is no commonly held legislation or treaty on privacy, but what is 
common among each nation’s data privacy legislation is that the respective organizations and data 
holders are responsible to exercise due diligence using reasonable methods to secure the privacy of 
information on penalty of severe consequences. However, what is considered to be “reasonable 
methods” for securing privacy of data is subject to each country’s individual definition. Nevertheless, 
most countries recognize a universal human “right to privacy”. 
No doubt further work will be required to ascertain and ensure that the proposed architecture will be 
compliant with extant as well as emerging privacy legislation. A comparative analysis of the privacy 
legislation of four countries will be done as part of the requirement specification of the proposed 
architecture. Tentatively, it is proposed that the four countries are Australia, the United States, the 
European Union, and either Taiwan or Singapore. 
The reason for the selection of these countries instead of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) or MIST 
(Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey), where technology off-shoring is growing, is because 
legislation on privacy and data collection in the selected countries have been given increasing focus in 
previous years. 
3 THE APPROACH – A HOLISTIC SOLUTION 
There are many security technologies that are available to the various organizations intending to 
secure their systems and data against unwanted access. However, the fact of the matter is that each 
technology will each individually solve only one aspect of the problem. A security architecture, which 
is a holistic approach that utilizes multiple, intermeshing security technologies, would be in a better 
position to provide a framework for security against current and emergent threats than piecemeal non-
integrated measures. 
It is the aim of this research to propose an Open and Trusted security architecture based on an 
extended Open and Trusted Health Information System (OTHIS) architecture for Business Intelligence 
and Big Data systems. 
The original OTHIS architecture was designed to address privacy and security requirements for Health 
Information Systems in a holistic manner by these requirements at each level within a general HIS 
framework to ensure protection of data from internal and external threats (Liu et al, 2008). 
3.1 Characterization of OTHIS 
OTHIS was characterized as: 
 An Open architecture for a holistic approach to Health Information Systems which is compliant 
with the requirements of health legislation 
 Built on top a ‘Trusted computing-base’ or Trusted Platform Module.  
 Being a modular system containing three main modules which consider security from the point of 
view of each of the three states of information: 
o Health Informatics Access Control 
o Health Informatics Application Security 
o Health Informatics Network Security 
The reasons for basing a security architecture for Big Data on the OTHIS architecture are three-fold. 
Firstly, the OTHIS architecture was designed to handle the privacy and security requirements of the 
healthcare industry, which places a high premium on keeping the confidentiality and privacy of client 
information, inviolate, while being compliant with existing health information legislation. This high 
level of information assurance coupled with ability to handle high volume information will lend itself 
effectively to Big Data analytics systems.  
Secondly, the OTHIS utilizes as foundation a trusted computing-base, also known as the Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM). Most organizations already possess or are in the process of acquiring 
hardware which incorporate TPM, and this should help the process of adoption. Furthermore, as the 
TPM is the recognized industrial standard for trustworthy computing, most major manufacturers and 
vendors already integrate these chips into their respective professional products. 
Thirdly, the modular nature of OTHIS which recognizes the need to secure and protect data in each of 
the three states of information, is essential in a case such as Big Data, where information is being 
transferred, processed and stored at close to real-time speeds. The modules will also provide 
overlapping fields of security coverage against threats (defence-in-depth). 
There are several criteria that can be conceived of as a start to adapt this framework for use in the Big 
Data analytics/Business Intelligence field: 
 Ensure that the architecture must fulfil all regulation and legislative requirements 
 Incorporate evolving cloud structures into an extended OTHIS architecture in order to be 
compatible with industry shift toward cloud-centric models. 
 Establish appropriate Authentication and Authorization for use of big data assets by way of well 
thought out Access Control policies 
 Have an appropriate method of monitoring and auditing use of big data assets 
 Make use of latest network security protocols such as TLS, IPSec, and DNSSec. 
 Use appropriate levels of encryption in order to safeguard the privacy of data as required by 
privacy legislation. 
 This architecture must retain enough performance to still be able to run analytic functions 
expeditiously while maintaining a secure operating state. 
4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 The Proposed Architecture 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Architecture 
4.1.1 Tier 1 – Governance 
It has already been described that compliance with legislation will be a part of the requirement 
specification for the development of the proposed architecture. Under the new Australian Privacy 
Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, the civil penalties for organizations or 
individuals who are found in breach of the Act can be up to 2,000 penalty units ($340,000) for 
individuals, or up to five times that (10,000 penalty points, or, $1,700,000) for organizations 
(Australian Parliament, 2012). 
It is almost universally recognized that a human element is one of the main components of Information 
Systems (IS) together with Hardware, Software, Data, and Procedure. Even when every technological 
aspect of the system is secure and trustworthy, it can still be compromised as a result of human action. 
Therefore it is vital to establish appropriate guidelines for user behaviour to supplement technological 
methods for IS security. 
4.1.2 Tier 2 – System 
The focus for the proposed will be the actual system tier itself. System security is composed of the 
Operating System (OS) and the Access Control (AC), Application Layer Security (ALS), and Network 
Security (NS) modules. Access Control is integrated into the OS and interfaces throughout the whole 
system. 
The trusted OS for OTHIS is SELinux (Liu et al., 2009) which uses a Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) schema. Due to need for fine layers of granularity, it will not be a pure MAC AC model that 
will suffice, but a joint one, perhaps Role Based Access Control (RBAC) or Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC) added to the mix. The OTHIS model was based on an RBAC-MAC hybrid which was 
suitable to the task for simultaneous control and flexibility when compared to a pure MAC schema. 
The SELinux kernel also has a sandbox mechanism that provides the ability to separate each of the 
applications running on the Application Layer in order to prevent alterations whilst still allowing 
communication of parameters and data between separate computing spaces similar to the concept of 
virtualization. This is particularly useful given the machine specifications of high performance 
computing allows different computing spaces for different tasks and means that even if one part of the 
system is compromised, it does not provide ingress to another area of the system facilitating quick fail 
recovery. 
Outside Access Control, the Application Layer also requires its own security mechanisms. Firstly, 
certain cryptographic methods such as a “keyed hash” function and requiring the use of a “message 
authentication code”. Liu et al (2008) believes that although there may be a performance penalty 
because of the necessary complexity of using public key cipher schemes in a situation where 
maintaining record confidentiality for multiple access roles, advances in hardware since then will have 
made the performance issue negligible.  
Other Application Layer Security mechanisms that could be implemented is the classification of how 
securely data should be held, what could be potentially called Sensitivity Labelling. Oracle (2003) has 
an implementation of what they call Label Security which discusses this particular concept coupled 
with Discretionary Access Control. However, Oracle’s implementation is at database level to provide 
label security at cell or role level. Perhaps a mechanism to label/classify/categorize the sensitivity of 
the different types of data in Big Data can be discovered. 
It is further proposed that a modified Digital Signature could be used to provide nonrepudiation at the 
user side by not only having the sender digitally sign, but the authorized recipient to sign. This has the 
benefit of requiring both sender and recipient to acknowledge dispatch/receipt of files but increases 
complexity by requiring two separate but uniquely verifiable digital signatures. This of benefit for the 
secure communication of datasets/information for providers-to-users as well as provider-to-provider. 
OTHIS currently does not include DNS authentication mechanisms and further work is required in 
extending the Network Security module to include mechanisms to verify and confirm that HTTP 
Servers are who they say they are, and allow for this architecture’s use in Cloud-based environments. 
4.1.3 Tier 3 – Platform 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, Tier 2 is the actual focus of the study proposed. In brief, Tier 3 is 
composed of the trusted firmware and hardware that comprise the Trusted Platform Module of the 
trusted computing platform. The workings of the Trusted Platform Module and associated hardware is 
outside the scope of the proposed study at this time. 
4.2 Verification method for architecture 
Construction of a physical prototype of the architecture would be attempted, as far as possible, within 
the scope of resources available, but it is probably that the proposed architecture will be verified 
through use of “codelets”. 
Codelets are, in essence sections of code which would demonstrate the feasibility, manageability and 
scalability of the technologies involved that amplify or make the architecture possible while still 
require far less, in terms of both human resource and funding. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, before any further inferences can be made, further investigation, confirmation, artefact-
building and, evaluation will have to be undertaken to determine the reasonableness, feasibility, 
manageability, scalability and performance of the proposed architecture as this just the beginning of 
this research undertaking and as such a working paper. 
The significance of this study will be demonstrating whether or not there is a sustainable method for 
establishing trust in Big Data analytics systems using architectural methods with the current state of 
technology from the perspectives of both user and provider. At the end of the day, this study will 
contribute to enable an acceptable level of trust for those who use Big Data analytics in decision 
making whilst maintaining compliance with respective privacy legislation. 
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